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Abstract
There is extensive discussion on whether spontaneous and explicit forms of ToM are based on the same cognitive/neural
mechanisms or rather reflect qualitatively different processes. For the first time, we analyzed the BOLD signal for false
belief processing by directly comparing spontaneous and explicit ToM task versions. In both versions, participants watched
videos of a scene including an agent who acquires a true or false belief about the location of an object (belief formation
phase). At the end of the movies (outcome phase), participants had to react to the presence of the object. During the belief
formation phase, greater activity was found for false vs true belief trials in the right posterior parietal cortex. The ROI
analysis of the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), confirmed this observation. Moreover, the anterior medial prefrontal
cortex (aMPFC) was active during the outcome phase, being sensitive to violation of both the participant’s and agent’s ex-
pectations about the location of the object. Activity in the TPJ and aMPFC was not modulated by the spontaneous/explicit
task. Overall, these data show that neural mechanisms for spontaneous and explicit ToM overlap. Interestingly, a dissoci-
ation between TPJ and aMPFC for belief tracking and outcome evaluation, respectively, was also found.
Key words: fMRI; spontaneous theory of mind; false belief
Introduction
Our capacity to represent others’ mental states, goals, beliefs
and intentions is of paramount importance for successful social
interaction. In traditional theory of mind (ToM; Premack and
Woodruff, 1978) tasks participants are required to explicitly rea-
son about the other’s mental states. In the ‘Sally–Anne’ false-
belief task, Sally observes an object being placed in a box and
then leaves the room. Following this, Anne moves the object to
a different box. When Sally reenters the room, participants
must indicate the location, in which they think Sally will look
for the object, that is thus they must represent Sally’s false be-
lief (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Based on this research, ToM
has been characterized as a hallmark of human cognitive
development: the attribution of mental states to others requires
executive resources (i.e. the ability to inhibit one’s own perspec-
tive) and language resources and emerges relatively late in the
development. Only by the age of 4 years, children are able to
pass false belief tasks (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen
et al., 1985; McKinnon and Moscovitch, 2007; Wellman et al.,
2001; Gweon et al., 2012).
Recently a mounting body of evidence has challenged this
traditional view. Behavioral tasks, measuring reaction times or
spontaneous looking patterns in adults and infants, suggest
that the ability to track beliefs and even false beliefs of others
may be engaged spontaneously in adults (Senju et al., 2009;
Kovacs et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2011) and present already in
infants, before children are able to pass standard false belief
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tasks (Clements and Perner, 1994; Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005;
Southgate et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007; Kovacs et al., 2010;
Senju et al., 2011). This research shows that we represent other’s
beliefs even when we are not required to do so and even in situ-
ations where other’s mental states are completely irrelevant for
our current goals.
In the study by Kovacs et al. (2010), 7-month-old infants are
presented with a video representing an agent who obtains cer-
tain knowledge about the location of an object. After that, in-
fants display surprise, as indexed by increased looking time,
when they are presented with a picture of the object that is con-
trary to the agent’s belief (Kovacs et al., 2010). In this study, the
same paradigm was also applied to adults, who showed a simi-
lar effect; in their case, it was indicated by their reaction times
to the (expected or unexpected) presence of the object. After the
presentation of a scene, reaction times to the appearance of an
object were short not only when the participant expected the
object to be present but also when the agent only (false belief
condition) believed the object would be present. Critically, par-
ticipants were never asked to consider the agent’s belief.
Schneider et al. (2011) provided evidence for such spontaneous
belief processing using a false-belief anticipatory looking para-
digm. Here, participants observed some movie clips depicting
an agent having true or false beliefs about the location of an ob-
ject. At the end of the movies, participants had eye movement
patterns consistent with belief tracking even though they re-
ported not to have been consciously engaged in mentalizing.
This suggests that people spontaneously engage in belief track-
ing as if they were explicitly asked to do it. Stronger support for
the overlap between spontaneous and explicit mentalizing
comes from a recent study. In their elegantly designed work,
Schneider et al. (2014a) investigated the extent to which the op-
eration of spontaneous ToM is modulated by task instructions.
One group of participants was given no task instructions, an-
other was instructed to track the position of the ball in the
scene, and a third was asked to do a tracking of the agent’s be-
lief. Despite different task goals, all groups’ eye-movement pat-
terns were consistent with belief analysis.
These findings represent evidence that humans spontan-
eously track the belief states of others in an unintentional
manner.
However, the question remains whether spontaneous and
explicit forms of ToM are based on the same cognitive/neural
mechanisms or rather reflect qualitatively different processes.
While some authors have generally questioned that spontan-
eous ToM tasks reflects mentalizing of any kind (Heyes 2014;
Phillips et al., 2015), others (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009) have
proposed two distinct ToM systems. They suggest the spontan-
eous ToM system is present early in life, is fast and efficient and
operates spontaneously/unconsciously whereas the explicit
form would develop later and would be slower, more deliberate
and flexible, but therefore also more cognitively demanding.
Finally, Carruthers (2016) postulates just a single mindreading
system, which sometimes operates fully automatically, some-
times in conjunction with the standing goal of anticipating peo-
ple’s behavior, and sometimes in a more controlled way (by
involving executive function and working memory).
Despite this lively debate, studies investigating similarities
and differences between spontaneous and explicit ToM are still
scarce (Schneider et al., 2014b; Van der Wel et al., 2014; Rosenblau
et al., 2015). To date, neuroimaging studies have mostly focused
on the neural correlates of explicit belief processing (e.g. Fletcher
et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Ruby and Decety, 2003; Saxe and
Kanwisher, 2003). These studies have revealed a quite consistent
pattern of brain regions involved when participants are asked to
reason about somebody else’s false belief. What is referred to as
the ‘ToM network’ includes the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ),
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS)
and precuneus (PC). A number of recent meta-analysis studies
confirm that ToM, across different tasks, consistently activates
TPJ and MPFC (e.g. Decety and Lamm, 2007; Van Overwalle, 2009;
Schurz et al., 2014).
To the best of our knowledge, only one study investigated the
neural bases of spontaneous ToM alone (Kovacs et al., 2014) and
only two studies have compared brain activation for spontaneous
and explicit ToM in the same participant with conflicting results
(Schneider et al., 2014b; Hyde et al., 2015). In the study of
Schneider et al. (2014b), brain activity was measured both during
the spontaneous ToM task of Schneider et al. (2011) described
above and a classical explicit task based on the presentation of a
text describing short stories. The authors first identified a set of
ROIs through an explicit localizer task where participants had to
read short stories and answer questions about a person’s belief.
Following this, they observed that only a subset of the regions
showed significant activation for false beliefs in the spontaneous
task. In particular, the left STS and posterior cingulate (PC),
showed the predicted pattern (false belief> true belief) during the
spontaneous ToM video clips, while TPJ did not. This outcome
contrasts with the results of Hyde et al. (2015) who, using Near-
Infrared-Spectroscopy, found significant activation in the TPJ ROI
during spontaneous false belief task.
However, it is important to note that both studies used spon-
taneous and explicit tasks that involved different stimulus ma-
terials and different procedures, making it difficult to interpret
possible similarities/differences in brain activation.
The aim of the current study was therefore to compare brain
activity related to spontaneous and explicit mentalizing dir-
ectly, using a within-subjects design and identical stimuli and
procedure. To this end, participants, during fMRI, were pre-
sented with a new developed task. In this task, participants
watch short movies depicting an object moving in the scene
and an agent forming a true or false belief about the location of
the object in the outcome (belief formation phase; Kovacs et al.,
2010; Deschrijver et al., 2015). Participants are instructed to re-
spond to the presence of the object in the outcome phase at the
end of the movie (object detection). The new procedure inte-
grates catch questions presented at the end of the movies in a
small percentage of the trials so that the agent’s belief either re-
mained irrelevant for the task (spontaneous version; the ques-
tions concerned the color of the agent’s cap) or was relevant
(explicit version; participants were interrogated about the
agent’s belief). After the spontaneous task, that was always pre-
sented first, a debriefing session was included to ensure that
participants were unaware of the belief manipulation.
We compared brain activity during the belief-tracking phase
for false and true belief conditions in the spontaneous and ex-
plicit ToM tasks. Furthermore, we also looked at violation of ex-
pectation in the outcome phase. If the other’s beliefs are
spontaneously represented on-line, the evaluation of an out-
come will be affected by both the belief of the participant and
the belief of the agent.
Method
Participants
Twenty-three healthy students (5 males; age: mean¼ 22, rang-
ing from 19 to 25) participated on the basis of written informed
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consent. One participant was excluded from the final analyses
due to an error in data saving. The study was conducted accord-
ing to the Declaration of Helsinki, with approval of the local eth-
ics committee of the University Hospital Gent. All subjects had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No subject had a history
of neurological, major medical or psychiatric disorder. All par-
ticipants were right-handed as assessed by the Edinburgh hand-
edness questionnaire (Oldfield, 1971).
Procedure and design
The experiment comprised two main parts presented in a fixed
order: an spontaneous ToM task and an explicit version of the
same task. The two versions of the ToM task were identical ex-
cept for the presentation of catch questions at the end of some
trials. The catch questions were included to distract partici-
pants from the belief manipulation and to induce active belief
processing in the spontaneous and explicit task, respectively
(see below). The entire testing session was limited to 1hour.
Participants were lying in the MRI scanner while watching short
videos via a mirror. Our stimuli were created based on the study
of Kovacs et al. (2010).
All movies consisted of two phases: the belief formation
phase and the outcome phase. Themovies in the belief formation
phase differed along two aspects of the belief attributable to the
agent (Buzz Lyghtyear from the cartoon Toy Story): the agent’s
belief could be true or false (true: matching reality and participant
knowledge; false: not matching reality and participant’s know-
ledge) and belief content (positive content: the agent believes the
ball is present; negative content: the agent believes the ball is ab-
sent). The presence or the absence of the ball in the outcome
phase was completely independent of the belief formation phase,
because the ball was randomly present in 50% of the trials in all
the conditions (see below). Combined with the two versions of
the outcome phase (ball does or does not appear from behind the
occluder), there were 8 different conditions (8 movies) andmovies
were repeated 10 times in a random order for each task version
resulting in a total of 160 experimental trials. Responses were
given through a response box.
Participants kept their right and left index and middle fin-
gers on different buttons. The experiment consisted of two ses-
sions in which the spontaneous and the explicit ToM versions
were presented. Each version lasted about 25min and consisted
of 2 separate blocks (fMRI runs) with a short break in between.
After completion of the spontaneous version of the ToM task,
participants filled in a debriefing form based on the one used by
Schneider et al. (2013), which was adapted to the current task
and translated to Dutch. It consisted of five questions (see
Appendix A for an English translation). By the use of this form
we checked whether participants were aware of our belief
manipulation.
Stimuli and task
All movies comprised a belief formation phase and an output
phase. Each movie lasted 13.8 s.
Belief formation phase. As shown in Figure 1, all movies started
with an agent placing a ball on a table in front of an occluder.
Then the ball rolled behind the occluder. Following this, the
movies could continue in four ways depending on the experi-
mental conditions: (i) In the True Belief-Positive Content condi-
tion (PþAþ), the ball rolled out of the scene from behind the
occluder, and then rolled back behind the occluder (ball last
seen by the participant at 10 s; time information is given relative
to the beginning of the movie) in the agent’s presence. The
agent left the scene at 11 s. Thus, the agent could rightly believe
the ball to be behind the occluder. (ii) In the True Belief-
Negative Content condition (P A), the ball emerged from be-
hind the occluder without leaving the scene, then rolled back
behind the occluder, and finally left the scene (ball last seen at
10 s), all in the agent’s presence. The agent left the scene at 11 s.
Thus, the agent could rightly believe the ball not to be behind
the occluder. (iii) In the False Belief-Positive Content condition
(P Aþ), the order of when the ball and the agent left the scene
was reversed relative to the True Belief-Negative Content condi-
tion. Thus, the agent left the scene at 6 s. Then, the ball emerged
from behind the occluder without leaving the scene, rolled back
behind the occluder, and finally left the scene (ball last seen at
11 s), all in the agent’s absence. Thus, the agent could wrongly
believe the ball to be behind the occluder. (iv) In the False Belief-
Negative Content condition (Pþ A ), the ball rolled out of the
scene from behind the occluder in the agent’s presence. Then,
the agent left the scene at 9 s. In his absence, the ball rolled back
behind the occluder at 11 s. Thus, the agent could wrongly be-
lieve the ball not to be behind the occluder. As in the original
task, in order to keep participants’ attention during the presen-
tation of the movies, they were instructed to press a key with
the index finger of their left hand when the agent left the scene.
Outcome phase. At the end of each movie, the agent re-entered
the scene and the occluder fell down. The four conditions were
paired with two equally probable outcomes, in which the ball
was either present or absent behind the occluder. Participants
were instructed to press a key as fast as possible with the index
finger of their right hand when they detected the ball. The pres-
ence or the absence of the ball was completely independent of
the belief formation phase, because the ball was randomly pre-
sent in 50% of the trials in all the conditions. As a result of the
combination of belief formation phase (P A , PþAþ, Pþ A ,
P Aþ) and output phase (ball present Bþ, ball absent B) there
were eight different movies. Each movie was repeated 10 times.
Therefore, the entire experiment comprised 80 trials for the spon-
taneous version and 80 for the explicit version.
Spontaneous/explicit manipulation. The movies were identical
for the spontaneous and explicit versions. During both the
spontaneous and the explicit task, a question appeared ran-
domly in 18 trials after the end of the movie. Questions were
presented in black text on a light grey background for 1000ms.
In the spontaneous version, the question was: ‘Did Buzz have a
blue cap?’ The cap could be either blue (50% of the movies) or
red (50%). In the explicit version, the question was: ‘Did Buzz
think the ball was behind the screen?’ This was also true in 50%
of the movies. Questions were presented with a variable jitter
interval. A pseudo-logarithmic jitter was applied. Half of the
inter-trial intervals were short (range between 200 and 2000ms
steps of 600ms), one-third was intermediate (range between
2600 and 4400ms) and one-sixth was long (range between 5000
and 6800ms) with a mean inter-trial interval of 2700ms.
The words ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ were presented on the left or right
of the screen in both task versions. A 50% of catch questions
had ‘Yes’ printed left and ‘No’ right, 50% vice versa. In this way,
responses could not be planned in advance. Participants had to
respond to the answer on the left with their left middle finger
and to the answer on the right with their left index finger.
fMRI data acquisition
Images were collected with a 3 T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner
system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) using a
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32-channel radiofrequency head coil. Before the experiment
started, 176 high-resolution anatomical images were acquired
using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence [repetition time
(TR)¼ 2530ms, echo time (TE)¼ 2.58ms, image matrix¼ 256 
256, field of view (FOV)¼ 220mm, flip angle¼ 78, slice thick-
ness¼ 0.90mm, voxel size¼ 0.9  0.86  0.86mm (resized to 1 
1  1mm)]. Next, the experiment was performed during which
whole brain functional images were obtained. The functional
images were acquired using a T2*-weighted EPI sequence
sensitive to BOLD contrast (TR¼ 2000ms, TE¼ 28ms, image
matrix¼ 64  64, FOV¼ 224mm, flip angle¼ 80, slice thick-
ness¼ 3.0mm, distance factor¼ 17%, voxel size¼ 3.5  3.5  3.0,
34 axial slices). Volumes were aligned along the AC–PC axis.
fMRI data preprocessing
The fMRI data were analyzed with SPM8 software (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). The first four
volumes of all EPI series were used to allow the magnetization
to approach a dynamic equilibrium and were excluded from the
analysis. Data preprocessing started with spatially realigning
the functional images using a rigid body transformation. Then
the realigned images were slice time corrected with respect to
the first slice. The high-resolution structural image of each sub-
ject was co-registered with the mean image of the EPI series.
During segmentation, the structural scans were brought in line
with the tissue probability maps available in SPM. The param-
eters estimated during the segmentation step were then used to
normalize the functional images to standard MNI space. Finally,
the functional images were resampled into 3  3mm voxels and
spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8mm (full-width
at half maximum).
Behavioral data analysis
In both versions, spontaneous and explicit, we recorded RTs for
the detection of the ball at the end of each movie. Behavioral
performance therefore reflects a spontaneous measure of ToM
in both cases. Behavioral data were analyzed with IBM SPSS
Statistics 20 (SPSS, Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). For one participant,
detection responses were not correctly recorded due to tech-
nical problems (therefore, his/her data were excluded from this
analysis). However, the participant performed correctly on the
catch questions, showing that he/she was engaged in the task.
We performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on reaction times,
with task (spontaneous, explicit), belief (true belief, false belief)
and belief content (positive content, negative content) as
within-subject factors.
fMRI data analysis
The subject-level statistical analyses were performed using the
general linear model. The model contained separate regressors
for all possible combinations of Belief (true belief, false belief)
and Belief Content (positive content, negative content) for the
belief formation phase (duration of 9 s from the moment in
which the agent places the ball on the table to the moment in
which the agent comes back to the scene). For the outcome
phase, there were separate regressors for all possible combin-
ations of Belief, Belief Content and Outcome (ball present, ball
absent) (duration of 0 s). In total, the model included 12 regres-
sors of interest for the spontaneous task and 12 regressors of
interest for the explicit task. Six subject-specific regressors that
were obtained during the realignment step were added to ac-
count for head motion. All resulting vectors were convolved
with the canonical hemodynamic response function to form the
main regressors in the design matrix (the regression model).
The statistical parameter estimates were computed separately
for each voxel for all columns in the design matrix. Contrast
images of interest were created at the first level and were then
entered into a second level analysis with subject as a random
variable. Contrasts at this group level were made using one-
sample t-tests.
Contrasts were run separately for the belief formation phase
and the outcome phase. For the belief formation phase, in order to
identify regions involved in false belief tracking (belief formation
Fig. 1. Frames of two of the movies presented during the tasks. Example of a false belief condition (P–A) and a true belief condition (P–Aþ). There were eight condi-
tions in total, resulting from the combination of belief formation phase and outcome phase. In the first part of the movie, the ball rolls behind the screen. In the second
part (belief formation phase), in the presence of the agent, the ball can change location or stay behind the occluder. Afterwards the agent leaves the scene and the ball
can change its location or not. In the outcome phase, the agent comes back to the scene and the occluder is lowered. The ball is present or not (50% of the cases).
Please note that, in the ‘no change’ video fragment, the ball was moving anyway. For example, it would roll out from the occluder and then roll back behind the
occluder. In all movies, the ball was visible to the participant for the same amount of time.
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phase), our main contrast of interest was computed as follow:
false belief P Aþ and Pþ A (participant’s and agent’s belief do
not match)> true belief P A and PþAþ (participant’s
and agent’s beliefs match). The interaction between belief
and task (explicit> spontaneous task) was also calculated as
follow: (PAþ and Pþ A explicit> P A andPþAþ explicit)>
(P A andPþAþ spontaneous> P AþandPþ A spontan-
eous). In addition, we calculated a contrast based on the content
of the agent’s belief as follows: Aþ> A .
For the outcome phase, the agent’s and the participant’s be-
lief about the presence of the ball were considered with respect
to the actual presence of the ball in the outcome phase (B ball
absent, Bþball present). Therefore, we analyzed separately con-
ditions B and Bþ conditions. Violation of expectation was cal-
culated as a mismatch of the belief content and the actual
presence of the ball in the output phase. For example, if the ball
was absent at the end of the movie (B ), the agent’s expect-
ation (only) would be violated in the P Aþ condition. To iden-
tify regions involved in the violation of expectation, we
computed the main contrasts of interest as follows: (i) violation
of expectation based on the agent’s belief was calculated as fol-
low: P Aþ>P A for B trials and Pþ A >PþAþ for
Bþ trials. (ii) Violation of expectation based on participant’s be-
lief: Pþ A >P A for outcomes with no ball (B ) and P
Aþ>PþAþ for outcomes with ball (Bþ). We also computed the
interaction between agent’s violation of expectation and task:
spontaneous> explicit and explicit> spontaneous and between
participant’s violation of expectation and task (spontan-
eous> explicit and explicit> spontaneous). To correct for mul-
tiple comparisons a cluster-extent based thresholding approach
was used (Friston et al., 1996). First a primary uncorrected
threshold of P< 0.001 at voxel level was used to identify groups
of suprathreshold voxels. Second, a cluster-level extent thresh-
old, represented in units of contiguous voxels (k), was deter-
mined by SPM 8 (P< 0.05 FWE cluster corrected threshold). Only
clusters that have a k value that is equal or larger than this
threshold are reported. The coordinates reported correspond to
the MNI coordinate system.
In addition to the main analyses, we carried out a signal-
change analysis in the a priori defined region of interest (ROI)
based on a meta-analysis of peaks reported in 26 studies on
mentalizing (see Kovacs et al., 2014). The ROI was a sphere with
a radius of 10mm centered on the coordinates 56 47 33. Mean
b’s for the events of interest were extracted using the MARSBAR
toolbox for SPM (Brett et al., 2002). The b values obtained were
then subjected to a repeated-measures ANOVA containing the
factors task (spontaneous task, explicit task), belief (false belief,
true belief) and belief content (positive content, negative
content).
Results
Behavioral results
Performance on the catch question was well above chance both
for the spontaneous and the explicit version, with an accuracy
level of 82% (range of correct responses: 7–18) and 74% (range of
correct responses: 4–18), respectively. For the ball detection
task, a significant main effect of belief was found [F(1, 20)¼ 14.9,
P< 0.05, g2¼ 0.43), with RTs in false belief conditions being faster
than RTs in true belief conditions. More importantly, we found
a significant interaction between belief and belief content
[F(1, 20)¼ 7.94, P< 0.05, g2¼ 0.28). Pairwise comparisons of con-
ditions revealed that participants were significantly slower in
P A trials than in all other trials (Ps< 0.05). This pattern of
results overlaps completely with data from the original paper of
Kovacs et al. (2010). The fact that participants are faster both
when they expected the ball to be behind the occluder and
when only the agent expected the ball to be behind the occlude
(P Aþ condition) confirms that participants spontaneously
represent the other’s belief during the detection task.
Interestingly, although spontaneous and explicit versions ex-
hibited a very similar pattern of RTs, the impact of the agent’s
belief on performance, was even slightly stronger in the spon-
taneous version as attested by the interaction between task and
belief content [F(1, 20)¼ 4.4, P¼ 0.049, g2¼ 0.18). In the spontan-
eous task version, the difference in RTs between positive con-
tent trials (Aþ) and negative content trials (A ) was larger than
in the explicit version. This reveals that the effect of the agent
belief’s content was even stronger in the spontaneous than in
the explicit version. No interaction between belief, content and
task was found. Overall, this outcome supports the idea that, in
spontaneous version, beliefs are spontaneously processed.
Therefore, task instructions requiring participants to explicitly
attend the other’s perspective do not induce qualitative changes
in behavioral performance (Figure 2). This pattern of data com-
pletely overlaps with the results obtained in a recent behavioral
study from our group using the same stimulus material (Nijhof
et al., submitted for publication) and with what has been previ-
ously shown with a different task (Schneider et al., 2014a).
fMRI results
First, we aimed to identify regions that were involved in false
belief processing (false belief). Concerning the belief formation
phase, higher activity during false belief than true belief
occurred in angular gyrus (AG) (peak coordinates: 42 67 43) and
in fusiform gyrus/collateral sulcus (peak coordinates: 33 52 1).
Importantly, the computation of the interaction between belief
and task did not lead to any significant cluster of activation.
Also, no clusters emerged for the contrast positive>negative
belief content. Concerning the outcome phase, for outcomes
where the ball was absent (B ), violation of expectation based
on participant’s belief (Pþ A >P A , B ) revealed activa-
tion in the anterior MPFC (peak coordinates: 9 38 7). Violation of
expectation based on the agent’s belief (P Aþ> P A , B )
also activates the aMPFC (peak coordinates: 6 38 8). The AG
and the aMPFC clusters are shown in Figure 3. Moreover, the left
anterior insula (peak of activation: 33 32 11), the right occipi-
tal cortex, the left fusiform gyrus and the right sensorimotor
cortex were activated (Table 1 for a complete list of the areas
and coordinates). The anterior insula has been associated with
the evaluation of the affective consequences of our action
(Brass and Haggard, 2010; Koban and Pourtois, 2014) and it has
been considered crucial for the social interaction (e.g. Cracco
et al., 2016). For outcomes where the ball was present (Bþ),
violation of expectation based on participant’s belief (P
Aþ>PþAþ, Bþ) revealed activation in the supplementary
motor area (SMA), right sensorimotor cortex and the occipital
cortex. Violation of expectation based on the agent’s belief (Pþ
A >PþAþ, Bþ) did not lead to any cluster of activation.
Importantly, neither agent’s violation of expectation nor for the
participant did the interaction between expectation and task re-
veal any result. Motor activation emerging in different contrasts
probably reflects motor preparation of the left-side response
that was needed to respond to the catch questions. Although
the catch questions were only presented in a small percentage
of trials (about 20%), participants could not predict in which
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trials they would be present and therefore always prepared the
response. Results are summarized in Table 1.
ROI analysis. With this analysis we wanted to further explore
potential differences in belief processing between spontaneous
and explicit ToM versions of the task. More specifically, in the
study of Kovacs et al. (2014), an asymmetric effect has been
found in activation of the right TPJ during the spontaneous ToM
version. Results showed that TPJ is only active when a false be-
lief attributed to the agent has a positive content (the agent
thinks that the ball is behind the occluder). Such an asymmetry
may be due to task instructions, which required participants to
respond only to the presence of the target, but not to its ab-
sence. An alternative explanation is that this asymmetry is a
functional characteristic of the spontaneous belief tracking sys-
tem, which leads to preferential encoding of certain types of be-
lief contents, while ignoring others in specific situations. If the
asymmetry noticed by Kovacs et al. (2014) only occurs in the
spontaneous task then this would suggest that only spontan-
eous processing has this specialization.
We found a main effect of task [F(1, 21)¼ 4.39, P< 0.05,
g2¼ 0.17) with higher activation in the spontaneous when com-
pared with the explicit version. This effect is attributable to a
general decrease of the BOLD signal across the task blocks and
should not be interpreted as a specific effect of task manipula-
tion on TPJ activity.
More important, there was a main effect of belief with higher
activation values for false than for true belief conditions [F(1,
21)¼ 4.81, P< 0.05, g2¼ 0.17). Importantly, no interaction be-
tween belief and task emerged, supporting the results on our
whole brain analysis. Furthermore, there was a main effect of
content [F(1, 21)¼ 4.62, P< 0.05, g2¼ 0.18] with higher activation
when the agent belief has a positive content (Ballþ).
Importantly, a significant interaction effect of belief and content
was found [F(1, 21)¼ 7.98, P< 0.05, g2¼ 0.27]. Post hoc compari-
sons revealed a significantly higher activation for the false be-
lief, positive content condition as compared to the false belief,
negative content (P < 0.05). However, no interaction with the
task emerges. Our data therefore support the idea that our task
is sensitive to the content of false belief. However there is no
evidence for a dissociation between the spontaneous and expli-
cit version. Percentages signal change has been depicted in
Figure 4 for all task conditions.
Fig. 2. Reaction times for ball detection (spontaneous measure) are displayed for the four conditions of the task. (A) Behavioral performance under spontaneous ToM
task instructions. (B) Behavioral performance under explicit task instructions.
Fig. 3. Left panel. Cluster of activation in the PPC for the contrast false be-
lief > true belief (irrespective of the task) during the belief formation phase.
Right panel. Clusters of activation in the MPFC for the participant’s violation of
expectation (participant positive content prediction>negative outcome in
green) and the agent’s violation of expectation (agent positive content predic-
tion>negative outcome in blue) (irrespective of the task) in the outcome phase.
Table 1. Peaks of activation from different contrasts in the belief for-
mation phase and outcome phase of the videos
Area MNI peak
coordinates xyz
Cluster
size
Z-scores
Belief formation phase False > true belief
Angular gyrus 42 67 43 197 5.13
Fusiform gyrus/collateral sulcus 33 52 1 149 7.15
Outcome phase. Ball absent (B)
A þ P> A P
aMPFC 6 38 8 112 4.28
Right sensorimotor 42 22 46 536 5.34
Right occipital cortex 45 82 8 443 4.67
Left occipital cortex 15 64 2 152 3.78
Left anterior insula 33 32 11 228 4.28
A þ P> A P
aMPFC 9 38 7 292 4.24
Outcome phase. Ball present (Bþ)
A þ P> A þ Pþ
SMA 3 7 58 180 4.00
Thalamus 6 13 5 649 5.25
Right sensorimotor 39 16 43 508 5.09
Right occipital 36 94 8 653 4.52
Lingual gyrus 12 67 8 177 4.49
Left occipital 42 79 8 286 4.44
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Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that com-
pares spontaneous and explicit false beliefs processing by
adopting the same task procedure and stimuli in both task ver-
sions. Our data strongly support the idea that during spontan-
eous and explicit ToM, we track others’ belief by using the same
neural mechanisms that have been shown to be involved in ex-
plicit mentalizing. Importantly, the two task versions only dif-
fered for the spontaneous/explicit processing of the agent’s
belief. A debriefing procedure, allowed us to verify that partici-
pants were unaware of the belief manipulation during the spon-
taneous version of the ToM task. On the other hand, in the
explicit version, we have ensured that participants would expli-
citly track the agent’s belief. When we analyzed behavioral re-
sults from the ball detection task, we have shown the pattern of
reaction times is not affected by task instructions (spontaneous
vs explicit). This outcome support previous observations
derived from the same task (Nijhof et al., in press) or a different
one using eye gaze as dependent variable (Schneider et al.,
2014a). In the study of Schneider et al. (2014a), the authors gave
participants either no instruction, the instruction to track the
position of the ball in the scene, or the instruction to track the
agent’s belief. Here, eye-movement patterns were consistent
with belief analysis, irrespective of the task.
A possible limitation of our design is the fixed order of the
tasks. The spontaneous ToM task had to come always first as
participants would otherwise become aware of the belief ma-
nipulation. Although a general decrease of participants’ atten-
tion to the stimuli is expected in the second part of the
experiment, it is important to note that responses to catch
questions in the explicit task were still well above chance level
(74%), showing that participants were engaged in the task.
Our results show that spontaneous ToM processing activates
the same neural network that has been previously pointed out
as being critically involved in explicit ToM, specifically the right
TPJ and anterior MPFC (e.g. Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al.,
2000; Ruby and Decety, 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). A
number of recent meta-analysis studies indicate that explicit
ToM, across different tasks, consistently activates TPJ and MPFC
(e.g. Decety and Lamm, 2007; Van Overwalle, 2009; Schurz et al.,
2014). During the belief formation phase, greater activity
for false vs true belief conditions was found in the right
TPJ. Importantly, no interaction was found with the
spontaneous/explicit task. Overlapping results were obtained
for the whole-brain analysis (AG activation) and the ROI ana-
lysis when an a priori TPJ ROI was defined based on a meta-
analysis on explicit ToM. Moreover, the MPFC was active during
the outcome phase. The MPFC showed greater activation when
the outcome did not match expectations based on the preceding
events contained in the movie, as compared to when the out-
come did match expectations. Interesting, two partially overlap-
ping clusters were found for participant and agent’s violation of
expectation. Again, no interaction was found with the task
version.
Our outcome on the TPJ is in line with previous data from
ROIs analyses on a spontaneous ToM task (Kovacs et al., 2014;
Hyde et al., 2015). Moreover, activation of the TPJ in false belief
trials seems to be higher when the belief of the agent has a posi-
tive content (i.e. the agent falsely believed the ball was behind
the occluder). This pattern is in line with what was found in a
previous study adopting the spontaneous version of the same
task (Kovacs et al., 2010). In the same vein, violation of expect-
ation based on the agent’s belief, led to stronger activation in
the MPFC in trials with ball absent outcomes (that is, when the
agent expected the ball to be behind the occluder, positive con-
tent belief). This bias for agent’s beliefs with positive content
can reflect the specific instructions of our detection task. In fact,
participants were asked to respond only when the ball was pre-
sent at the end of the movie (ball present outcomes). This can
explain why the belief of the agent is more salient when it has a
positive content, which is when the agent expected the ball to
be behind the occluder. On the other hand, this effect might re-
flect a content-dependent representational constraint, or limit,
on spontaneous ToM, which restricts the system to tracking
false beliefs that may favor potential behaviorally relevant be-
liefs. This may reflect a functional difference between spontan-
eous and explicit ToM (Kovacs et al., 2014). A possible
representational limit of the spontaneous ToM system has been
previously identified for object identity (Low and Watts, 2013).
However, since responses in our ball detection task reflect a
spontaneous measure of ToM in both our task, future studies
are needed to give a more definitive answer to this question.
It has been proposed that behavioral effects in spontaneous
ToM tasks do not reflect spontaneous ToM but could rather be
explained by domain-general cognitive mechanisms, such as
response selection, attentional orienting or spatial coding of
Fig. 4. Percentages signal change (Beta signal change) in the TPJ ROI for all task conditions are depicted.
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response locations, which simulate the effects of mentalizing
(Heyes, 2014; Philips et al., 2015). On the contrary, if a spontan-
eous ToM task reflects mentalizing, one would expect task ma-
nipulation to induce activation in brain areas that are
commonly associated with ToM (i.e. TPJ and aMPFC). Our fMRI
data, together with previous observations (Kovacs et al., 2014;
Hyde et al., 2015) support this idea. Moreover, Deschrijver et al.
(2015) recently carried out the same paradigm (spontaneous
version only) in a group of adults with autism spectrum dis-
order (A). Here a ‘ToM index’ has been calculated as the differ-
ence between the P A and the P Aþ conditions,
representing the degree to which the agent’s belief about the
presence of the ball influences RTs. The size of individuals’
‘ToM index’ was found to correlate with A symptom severity in
the A group.
Our results are in contrast with the previous neuroimaging
study of Schneider et al. (2014b). There, having identified ROIs
based on an explicit ToM task, during the spontaneous ToM
task, the authors found a significant difference in the BOLD sig-
nal between false and true belief conditions only in the left STS
and precuneus (PC) but not in the TPJ, although the comparison
was in the right direction (higher activation for false vs true be-
lief). One possible explanation for this discrepancy lies in differ-
ences in the tasks and stimuli used. In effect, the explicit task
adopted in the study of Schneider et al. was a common task
used in false belief research involving reading stories describing
someone’s knowledge and beliefs (linguistic material) and then
answering a question. Moreover, in that study, the analysis of
the BOLD signal has not been performed on the belief formation
phase (referred to as belief set-up sequence) but only on the
output phase (belief test phase). In our experiment, TPJ activa-
tion only emerges in the belief formation, and not in the out-
come phase. Therefore, methodological and analysis
differences between the two studies can account for the dis-
crepancy. Finally, there is another, perhaps theoretically more
interesting, reason for why our results (and the results of Hyde
et al., 2015) differ from those obtained by Schneider et al. (2014b).
This difference concerns the true belief condition used to com-
pute the main contrast of interest (FB>TB). In the true belief
condition of our task, since both the agent and the participant
observe the ball reaching its last position before the agent
leaves the scene (no changes occur after that), the agent has all
the information the participant has. In other words, in the par-
ticipant’s perspective, the agent has knowledge about the pos-
ition of the ball. In the true belief condition of Schneider et al.
(2014b), the agent does not have all relevant knowledge, but in-
stead holds a belief that accidentally becomes true at the end.
In effect, the ball still moves from its location when the agent is
not in the scene and reaches its final position only at the end of
the movie. Although it is a matter of debate whether true beliefs
are processed differently from the state of reality, or knowledge
(Sommer et al., 2007; Aichhorn et al., 2009; Back and Apperly,
2010), both behavioral and neuroimaging evidence suggests
that true belief reasoning is different from reasoning about the
state of reality. For example, in a study by Do¨hnel et al. (2012),
brain activity for false and true belief reasoning has been com-
pared with state of reality-control conditions. When compared
with this control condition, right TPJ activity was observed both
for true and false belief reasoning. We can argue that the prob-
ability of representing true beliefs is higher if true beliefs do not
match the state of reality; and therefore, do not completely
overlap with the participant’s knowledge. In this sense, con-
trasting a false with a true belief condition (equal to knowledge)
as in the present study (and in the study of Hyde et al., 2015)
would be more sensitive in capturing belief processing than
contrasting a false belief with a true belief (different from know-
ledge) condition as in Schneider et al. (2014b). In any case, fur-
ther studies are needed to understand whether and how true
belief tracking occurs in spontaneous ToM tasks.
Although we are aware that the time resolution of fMRI does
not allow us to argue about a strong dissociation between the
belief formation phase and the outcome phase in our task, sep-
arate regressors for the two phases have been included in the
model. Our results suggest that TPJ is more involved in the be-
lief formation phase while the aMPFC seems to be implicated to
a greater extent in the outcome phase. Despite extensive re-
search on the role of TPJ and aMPFC in ToM and social cognition
in general, the differential role of these two areas is still poorly
understood. However, from a functional–anatomical point of
view, it is unlikely that both areas serve the same function. For
example, Saxe and Powell (2006) suggest that the MPFC recruit-
ment is not restricted to reasoning about another person’s
thoughts (the later-developing component of ToM) or even sub-
jective, internal states in general, but may be involved more
broadly in representing socially or emotionally relevant infor-
mation about another person. Van Overwalle (2009) hypothe-
sized that the mPFC is engaged in making inferences about
permanent social and psychological properties of others, such
as personality traits. Moreover, outside the domain of social
cognition, the aMPFC has long been associated with the encod-
ing of the outcome (O’Doherty et al., 2002; Kennerley and Wallis,
2009; Rushworth et al., 2011).
In the current work, we have shown neural activation pat-
terns for spontaneous and explicit ToM overlap. However, this
does not provide definitive evidence that spontaneous ToM is
based on the same mechanisms involved in explicit ToM. We
cannot rule out the possibility that activation in the spontan-
eous condition was driven by attentional processes in the TPJ,
causing an overlap with activity for explicit ToM. This interpret-
ational challenge is a limitation for the present and numerous
fMRI-based studies in the social neuroscience domain, as inter-
pretations rely on reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006).
The TPJ has been related to key computations in the social do-
main, such as ToM, self-other distinction in the control of imita-
tion, agency processing and perspective taking (e.g. Ruby and
Decety, 2001; Blanke et al., 2002; Farrer and Frith, 2002; Farrer
et al., 2003; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Legrand and Ruby, 2009; Brass
et al., 2009) but also in other non-social processes, such as spatial
attention (Corbetta et al., 2002; Mitchell, 2008). Although it is out
of the scope of this work to enter the discussion about domain-
specific or domain-general neural computation of the TPJ, recent
models try to reconcile observations from the social and other
cognitive neuroscience fields suggesting that TPJ is involved in re-
orienting of attention toward unexpected relevant events
(Corbetta et al., 2008) or ‘contextual updating, updating of internal
models based on incoming incongruent information’ (Geng and
Vossel, 2013). Accordingly, TPJ would help updatingmental repre-
sentations based on changes (we did not necessary attend to)
occurring in the environment. In line with this idea, we have
found preferential activation of TPJ during the tracking period of
other’s beliefs (belief formation phase). Moreover, following the
same idea, we should not expect differences between spontan-
eous and explicit ToM. Moreover, this outcome is in line with the
self-other distinctionmodel were TPJ detects an incongruence be-
tween internally generated representation and externally trig-
gered representation (e.g. Brass et al., 2009).
Recently, the temporal profile of processing another person’s
visual perspective has been investigated using event-related
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potentials (ERPs; McCleery et al., 2011). In this study, participants
were asked to actively take the perspective of an agent or sim-
ply their own regarding the number of displayed disks on a
wall. McCleery et al. concluded that early in visual perspective
processing the temporal and parietal cortices distinguish be-
tween self and other perspectives and then, later, the frontal
cortex resolves conflicts between these representations during
response selection. Importantly, however, McCleery et al.’s
study design was focused on visual perspective taking and did
not examine brain regions involved in a classic false-belief pro-
cessing task. Moreover, source analysis of the EEG signal
referred to the later prefrontal cortex. Although behavioral stud-
ies have suggested a possible dissociation between belief calcu-
lation/tracking and response selection in ToM (Leslie and
Thaiss, 1992; Leslie et al., 2005; Qureshi et al., 2010), it remains
unclear what the specific role of TPJ and MPFC is and how these
regions may interact with each other.
In summary, our findings suggest that mechanisms underly-
ing the spontaneous tracking of others’ beliefs may exploit simi-
lar representational systems as explicit ToM judgments do. In
fact, neural mechanisms for spontaneous and explicit ToM
overlap when tasks are equal in terms of stimulus materials
and procedure. Interestingly, the analyses on the belief forma-
tion phase and outcome phase suggest dissociation between
TPJ and aMPFC, with TPJ being preferentially activated for belief
tracking and the aMPFC for outcome evaluation.
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Appendix. Debriefing form (translated
from Dutch)
1. Do you have an idea what the goal of this experiment was?
2. Did you notice anything unusual about the movies?
3. Did you notice any particular pattern or theme to the
movies?
4. Did you have any particular goal or strategy?
10 | Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2016, Vol. 0, No. 0
